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Abstract—The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) supports
a range of video conferencing, telephony, and streaming video ap-
plications, but offers few native security features. We discuss the
problem of securing RTP, considering the range of applications.
We outline why this makes RTP a difficult protocol to secure, and
describe the approach we have recently proposed in the IETF to
provide security for RTP applications. This approach treats RTP
as a framework with a set of extensible security building blocks,
and prescribes mandatory-to-implement security at the level of
different application classes, rather than at the level of the media
transport protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Real-time multimedia comprises a large, and rapidly grow-
ing, fraction of the traffic on the Internet. This traffic can be
broadly divided into two categories: streaming and interactive.
Streaming multimedia is typically delivered using some variant
of dynamic adaptive streaming over HTTP [1], building
on the web content distribution infrastructure for scalability.
Interactive multimedia, including mobile telephony, voice over
IP, video conferencing, telepresence, and the emerging WebRTC
standards [2] overwhelmingly uses the Real-time Transport
Protocol (RTP) [3] for media transport. RTP has proven to be
an effective basis for such applications, supporting a wide range
of use cases, media codecs, error correction and concealment
mechanisms, and performance monitoring tools. However, the
base RTP specification offers only minimal security features.
The limited provisions for security in the base RTP standards
were not due to lack of interest or awareness by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) or the research community.
Indeed, the Mbone multicast video conferencing tools [4],
[5], [6], [7], some of the earliest research prototypes of RTP,
incorporated strong (for the time) media path encryption, and
experimented with various key distribution schemes. Rather,
the limited security options in the baseline protocol are due
to conflicting security requirements, making it unclear what
features should be provided as standard.
In this paper, we show that no single media path security
or key exchange mechanism is sufficient to secure the RTP
protocol. Rather, we recognise that a framework approach
must be adopted, using security building blocks that can be
composed to suit the requirements of particular classes of
application, rather than trying to secure the protocol as a whole.
Our contribution has been to identify that such a framework
is needed, and to achieve consensus on the approach in IETF,
ensuring that future application classes will be required to
describe a clear security architecture around how they use
RTP. We review and justify this approach, and discuss how
RTP security extensions are developing to support emerging
applications, such as WebRTC. We conclude with a discussion
of the applicability of these ideas to new media transport
protocols.
This paper builds on two recent proposals we made to the
IETF [8], [9]. We review the arguments for treating RTP as a
framework with pluggable security building blocks suited to
different use cases, and extend them with additional motivation,
history, and discussion of the relevant issues. The RTP protocol
is novel in that it supports a much broader range of transport
topologies and reliability modes than other transport-layer
protocols, such as TCP, DCCP [10], and SCTP [11]. This
leads to wide-ranging, and potentially conflicting, security
requirements. The issues explored here in the context of RTP are
therefore potentially applicable to future transport protocols that
offer flexibility to support many different application scenarios,
topologies, and classes of reliability. With the resurgence in
interest in new transport protocols, such as TCP Minion [12],
QUIC, etc., and the recent Transport Services (TAPS) BoF in
IETF, these issues potentially have broad applicability.
We structure the remainder of this paper as follows. We
begin by reviewing security requirements for Internet standards
in Section II, and the security features offered by RTP in
Section III. Use case and applications of RTP are outlined
in Section IV, and Section V describes the implications of
these for securing the RTP framework. Section VI discusses
mandatory to implement security mechanisms for RTP. Finally,
Section VII concludes.
II. SECURITY FOR INTERNET STANDARDS
The Internet standards community has long considered the
need for strong security in network protocols. The so-called
“Danvers Doctrine”, named after the location of the meeting
where it was formulated in 1995, states that IETF should
standardize the best available security for network protocols,
regardless of national policies.
This policy led the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) to issue a
Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet [13]
in 1996, noting the need for strong encryption to protect the
privacy of Internet users and to secure commercial transactions
on the network, and the adoption of a formal policy on Strong
Security Requirements for IETF Standard Protocols [14] in
2002. This policy states that the IETF “MUST implement strong
security in all protocols to provide for the all too frequent day
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when the protocol comes into widespread use in the global
Internet”. It is, however, important to note that the requirement
is that strong security must be implemented, not that it must
be used. The goal is that users will have the option of using
those protocols in a secure manner. The IETF cannot, and does
not try to, enforce the use of strong security.
More recently, the IETF has considered the issue of
pervasive network monitoring. It was concluded that “Pervasive
monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated in
the design of IETF protocols, where possible” [15]. That is,
the IETF policy is that pervasive monitoring is to be treated
as any other man-in-the-middle attack on the protocols, and
should be prevented by the same means used to prevent other
such attacks. Taken together, these policies point to a clear
requirement that protocol standards, such as the RTP standards,
need to provide strong, mandatory to implement, security.
III. SECURITY FEATURES OF THE RTP STANDARD
The previous section demonstrated the clear consensus in the
IETF that all Internet standard protocols need to provide strong
security. The first version of the RTP standard was published in
1996 [16], pre-dating publication of the IETF policy documents
in this area, and the majority of protocol development work
was completed before the adoption of the Danvers Doctrine.
Despite this, the RTP protocol and its early implementations
did provide confidentiality through encryption of RTP packets
using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in cipher block
chaining (CBC) mode. Authentication and message integrity
were not defined, “since these services would not be directly
feasible without a key management infrastructure” [16].
The authors of [16] were aware of the limitations of the
security service they proposed. Indeed, the protocol specific-
ation states that “other services, other implementations of
services and other algorithms may be defined for RTP in the
future if warranted. The selection presented here is meant to
simplify implementation of interoperable, secure applications
and provide guidance to implementers. No claim is made that
the methods presented here are appropriate for a particular
security need.”
A revision to RTP specification was published in 2003
[3] that deprecates the confidentiality mechanism in the base
specification. This revision suggests the Secure RTP (SRTP)
profile (still under development at that time, but now published
as [17]) as a likely replacement security mechanism. The
SRTP profile has indeed seen wide adoption, and is appropriate
and provides suitable strong security for many applications.
However, it has become clear that the SRTP profile is not
suitable for all applications using RTP. In Section IV we discuss
use cases of RTP, highlighting where SRTP is not appropriate.
Then, in Section V, we describe available security options.
IV. RTP APPLICATIONS AND USE CASES
RTP is used by a wide range of applications, supporting
different topologies and use cases. To understand the security
requirements, we must first review how the protocol is used.
A. RTP Topologies
RTP is inherently a group communication protocol, that can
be used in a wide range of different topologies. These include
point-to-point unicast communication, group communication
using unicast to some middlebox such as a media mixer,
transcoders, and other protocol translator, any source multicast,
or source-specific multicast [18].
In the simplest case, RTP sessions are point-to-point
between two endpoints. In these cases, RTP security is primarily
concerned with providing confidentiality from third-parties,
integrity protection, and authentication of the endpoint identity
to prevent spoofing.
RTP is not solely designed for point-to-point communic-
ation, however, and also supports group communication as
a fundamental part of the protocol. This leads to challenges
with source identity, authentication, and access control that
are inherently different to those with point-to-point sessions.
In some cases, the group communication is provided by a
multicast group, adding the challenge of unreliable UDP-based
communication to the problems of group security. In other
cases, group communication is supported by incorporating
central middleboxes such as audio mixers, video switchers, or
media transcoders into the RTP session. The extent to which
such middleboxes are trusted to access the media varies, with
many conferencing applications granting them full access, while
some TV distribution applications do not trust the middleboxes
in the content distribution network with access to the media
data, and only grant access to the header metadata.
B. RTP Application Scenarios
RTP is also used for a range of different applications, and
has been deployed in numerous different scenarios. Examples
include, but are not limited to:
• Point-to-point telephony and voice-over-IP;
• Point-to-point video conferencing and telepresence;
• Centralised group video conferencing and telepresence,
using a Multipoint Conference Unit or similar middle-
box to perform audio/video mixing or video switching;
• Mbone-style video conferencing [4] using Any Source
Multicast and the light-weight sessions model;
• Point-to-point streaming audio and/or video (e.g., on-
demand streaming, often with RTSP [19] control);
• Cable TV replacement services offered by residential
ISPs, or in the mobile space as the 3GPP Multimedia
Broadcast Multicast Service, using Source-Specific
Multicast (SSM) streaming to large groups of receivers;
• Replicated unicast (peer-to-peer) streaming to a group
of receivers;
• Interconnecting components in music production stu-
dios and video editing suites;
• Interconnecting components of distributed simulation
systems; and
• Streaming real-time sensor data, for example in some
e-VLBI radio astronomy test-beds.
The key point is that these use cases vary in size from two
participant point-to-point sessions to multicast groups with tens
of thousands (or, perhaps, even millions) of participants, vary
between interactive to non-interactive, and from low bandwidth
(kilobits per second) telephony to high bandwidth (multiple
gigabits per second [20], [21]) video and data streaming.
Most applications of RTP run over unreliable UDP streams,
but some build on TCP or DCCP [10] transport for NAT
traversal, reliability, or congestion control reasons. Some use of
RTP run solely on highly reliable optical networks, while others
use low rate unreliable wireless networks. Some applications
of RTP operate entirely within a single trust domain, others run
inter-domain, with untrusted (and, in some cases, potentially
unknown) users. The range of scenarios is wide, and increasing
in both number and in heterogeneity.
V. SECURING THE RTP PROTOCOL FRAMEWORK
As discussed in Section II, the IETF requires all protocols
to provide strong, mandatory-to-implement, security. This
promotes the overall security of the network by ensuring that
all implementations of a particular protocol are capable of
interoperating in a secure manner. The wide range of topologies
and use cases of RTP, described in Section IV, significantly
complicate the security options for RTP, however. In the
following we describe the requirements, then some of the
media security and session establishment protocols used.
A. Requirements
Considering different application use cases and topologies,
several different security requirements emerge. These include:
• Confidentiality of the media. Who has access to the
media streams, and for how long are they granted
access. This is particularly complex in group com-
munication scenarios where group membership can
change, since this will involve revoking the credentials
of the leaving member, or updating the credentials of
the other group members, so that the leaving member
has no access once they have left the group. The use
of centralised conferencing servers to distribute the
media can simplify this problem, but there are still
issues with scaling sessions that grow too large for a
single server to support. Controlling membership of
multicast sessions is a subset of the reliable multicast
problem, and is subject to many challenges as a result.
• Integrity protection to detect corruption in the net-
work and to prevent third-parties from unauthorised
modification of content. Heavily compressed audio-
visual content is sensitive to corruption because errors
disrupt the codec state and propagate (if they don’t
stop coding entirely), so effective integrity protection
is a must if the underlying network is not reliable. This
becomes an issue in group communication scenarios
using middleboxes for content distribution, since media
manipulation by the middlebox is, in many ways,
indistinguishable from media manipulation by an
attacker; they key difference being that it is wanted
modification, rather than unwanted. Applications need
to consider whether hop-by-hop security, with some
evidence that the desired middlebox is present in the
session, is sufficient; or if true end-to-end integrity
protection is needed. If the latter, to what extent can be
middlebox perform media mixer or other manipulation?
• Integrity is closely tied with source authentication,
that seeks to determine who sent a particular RTP
packet, and identity. Again, use of group communica-
tion complicates the issues, leading to consideration
whether it is necessary to authenticate individual
participants, or just to authenticate them as a valid
member of the group. If middleboxes are being used
to support the group, the question of whether the
middlebox or the participants are being authenticated
applies, especially if the goal is to authenticate data
as being from a valid group member.
• Finally, privacy is an issue. Applications that commu-
nicate directly between peers expose the IP address of
the peer, but this may be sensitive information for some
applications, because it can expose the geographic
location of the user. This can be addressed by the use
of relays, provided the relay is trusted, or by the use of
anonymity services such as Tor. These expose issues
with integrity, confidentiality, etc., as discussed earlier.
Much of the challenge in securing RTP comes because
different applications that use the protocol have widely differing
requirements for these security properties.
B. Media Path Security
The range of scenarios and use cases for RTP has led
to multiple media security protocols being developed, each
addressing different requirements.
The most widely applicable of these media security pro-
tocols is the secure RTP (SRTP) profile [17]. SRTP is an
application-level security solution, that encrypts RTP payload
data running over UDP to provide confidentiality, and provides
source origin authentication as an option. SRTP was designed to
be low overhead, and to support the group communication and
third-party performance monitoring features of RTP. It leaves
RTP protocol headers in the clear to simplify operation through
middleboxes and to support header compression for use of low-
speed links. SRTP provides strong support for cryptographic
algorithm agility. The mandatory-to-implement transforms are
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in counter mode,
with 160-bit keyed HMAC-SHA-1 and an 80-bit authentication
tag. Alternative transforms can be negotiated, and the protocol
currently also support AES in f8 mode, AES in Galois Counter
Mode with CBC MAC, SEED, ARIA, and other transforms.
Datagram TLS [22] is an extension to Transport Layer
Security (TLS) [23] that works over an unreliable datagram
transport, such as UDP. It can be used with RTP, encapsulating
RTP packets inside DTLS, to provide security analogous
to TLS but for point-to-point datagram traffic. DTLS offers
confidentiality, integrity protection, and can offer source origin
authentication if the client or server certificates can be verified
and provide a usable identity. DTLS operates in point-to-point
mode only, and so requires the use of a middlebox for multiparty
applications. In this case it offers security for each connection
to the middlebox, but the middlebox itself has to be trusted
with the media.
RTP is most commonly used over UDP, to give the
application visibility into, and some control over, the delivery,
error recovery, and congestion control processes. There is
nothing in the protocol that requires operation over UDP
however, and some implementations run over TCP, accepting
reliable delivery and TCP congestion control, often to simplify
NAT traversal. When RTP is run over a point to point TCP
connection, TLS can be used to protect that connection [24].
This offers confidentiality, integrity protection, and possible
source origin authentication, much as was just described for
RTP over DTLS, with the same limitations regarding trusted
middleboxes and point-to-point communication.
As an alternative to the transport layer mechanisms, RTP
flows can be secured at the network layer using IPSec [25] to
protect the RTP packets in transit between network interfaces
on the sender and receiver hosts. IPSec can be used in either
transport or tunnel mode, depending on needs, but perhaps
most common is tunnel mode as a virtual private network
(VPN), protecting RTP and all other traffic across a particular
network path. A concern with this approach is that the VPN
often terminates at some intermediate node, rather than at the
final destination, and so leaves traffic unprotected for some part
of the path. This may be sufficient in many cases, however,
depending on the security risks deemed important. For example,
users within the network belonging to a particular organisation
might be considered trusted, with the VPN being used to tunnel
traffic from roaming users back to the home organisation. The
increased use of pervasive monitoring increases the risk of this
approach, but it may be acceptable nonetheless.
There are also various media content security and digital
rights management solutions that provide security for media
content transported in RTP. Some of these solutions encrypt
only the media content, and operate within the RTP payload
data, leaving payload and RTP headers unprotected. A common
rationale for this is streaming media where the streaming server
is not trusted, and has to work with pre-encrypted content (i.e.,
content that is encrypted by the media producer, and can be
decrypted by the end user, but not by the intermediate content
distribution infrastructure). One example of this approach is the
Internet Streaming Media Alliance (ISMA) content Encryption
and Authentication standard [26]. This describes how content
stored as MPEG elementary streams within an ISO media file
can be encrypted and conveyed within the RTP payload format
for generic MPEG-4 streams, leaving the RTP and payload
headers in the clear.
The different approaches highlighted, and others that
undoubtedly exist, show the range of media security protocols.
Some support group communication; some do not. Some are
optimised for low-overhead, header compression, and low speed
links; others are not. Some require reliable transport; others do
not. Some allow intermediate nodes to access the media; some
do not trust such nodes. There are a range of options.
C. Session Establishment
To complement the variety of media security protocols,
there are a range of session establishment protocols. These
are primarily designed to support negotiation of media codecs,
transport protocols, network addresses, etc., to be used for the
session, but can also be used to bootstrap security for the media
security protocols that cannot do so themselves.
The secure RTP profile has no integrated key management
protocol, and instead relies on external key management. There
are four commonly used key management protocols: DTLS-
SRTP, MIKEY, SDP security descriptions, and ZRTP:
• As noted in Section V-B, DTLS can be used directly
to protect RTP session, sending RTP packets inside
DTLS packets. The DTLS-SRTP protocol [27], [28] is
an optimisation to this, that uses DTLS key exchange
but sends SRTP packets without DTLS encapsulation,
hence reducing the per-packet header overhead. This
is important for low-rate applications, such as voice
over IP. As with regular DTLS, it can support perfect
forward secrecy, cipher suite agility, source authentic-
ation with the aid of an identity service, and so on.
Since it builds on DTLS, this is a point-to-point session
establishment protocol, and requires middleboxes to be
trusted. DTLS-SRTP is the preferred key management
protocol for WebRTC [29].
• MIKEY [30] is a keying protocol with a range of
modes that is designed to support not just point-to-
point applications, but also broadcast and multicast
applications, and centralised group communication
with a shared security context for the group. MIKEY
can be embedded into existing session establishment
protocols, such as SIP, or sent directly over UDP.
• SDP security descriptions [31] can be used to ex-
change keys in the context of an SDP offer/answer
exchange for example as part of a SIP call. It assumes
the signalling channel and any signalling servers are
securely protected, and sends the media keys in plain
text within that channel. As such, it has questionable
security outside walled garden networks with trusted
operators. Despite that, it is widely used.
• ZRTP [32] is an alternative to DTLS-SRTP that
provides best-effort encryption with key continuity.
It uses either a short authentication string exchanged
over the media path (i.e., read out and compared by
users) or public key infrastructure for authentication.
Content security and digital rights management protocols
used with RTP, such as ISMACryp [26], also require key
management protocols to pass media access keys to the
end users. These are typically coupled with subscription
management, billing, and identity services. We do not consider
details of such protocols further here.
As with media security protocols, the key point from this
discussion is not the details of the specific key exchange
and session establishment protocols, but rather the range of
protocols used, and their different properties.
VI. MANDATORY-TO-IMPLEMENT SECURITY FOR RTP
To ensure that all users of the RTP protocol have access
to strong security, it would be desirable if a single media
security protocol and a single session establishment protocol
could be developed to suit the various application scenarios
and topologies where RTP is used. As the discussion in Section
V has shown, however, this will be a challenge. Unifying
security mechanisms across a particular topology (e.g., for all
unicast RTP flows, or for all multicast RTP sessions) is difficult
because different applications use those RTP topologies in
different ways. Unifying across application scenarios may be
possible in closely related areas, but fails when considering the
range of use cases.
We are not aware of any protocols that meet the needs of all
applications, and think it unlikely that any will be developed,
since the appropriate security mechanism for one scenario does
not work for some other scenarios where RTP is used. It is
difficult to meet the IETF requirement for strong mandatory-to-
implement security [14] for all users of RTP. The requirements
of the various use cases are simply too different for a common
solution to work.
A. Mandatory-to-implement Security for Framework Protocols
For a framework protocol, such as RTP, it appears therefore
that the only reasonable way to provide strong security is to
develop security building blocks that can be combined to meet
the needs of particular classes of application; then to mandate
particular combinations of building blocks for particular classes
of application. In essence, the requirement for strong mandatory-
to-implement security is moved from the low-level protocol
component, to a higher-level application class.
In the RTP context, existing media security building blocks
are outlined in Section V-B and signalling building blocks
in Section V-C. A security architecture document needs to
be written for a particular class of application, specifying the
media path security and keying protocols that are mandatory-
to-implement for those applications. An example of such an
application class is Web Real-time Communication (WebRTC)
system specified by the W3C and IETF [33], where the IETF
has mandated the combination of the SRTP profile for media
path security with DTLS-SRTP as the key exchange protocol
as the mandatory to implement security building blocks [29].
The case of WebRTC is illustrative of the requirement for
different media security and keying requirements for different
application scenarios. For example, the set of security building
blocks using in WebRTC differs from that used in SIP-based
voice telephony applications. The requirement in the telephony
community for interworking between SIP-based applications
and the legacy PSTN drives a strong need for middleboxes to
be trusted, and able to access the media in certain cases so
they can gateway it into non-RTP environments. Both WebRTC
and the telephony community have chosen SRTP as the media
path security, but the telephony community generally makes
use of SDP security descriptions in place of DTLS-SRTP for
key exchange, trusting the middleboxes.
Another illustrative example application scenario is RTP-
based cable TV replacement services using IP multicast media
distribution. These often source content from traditional TV
broadcasters as MPEG Transport Streams, with media content
security being provided at the payload level, leaving no need
for RTP-layer media path security, and couple key distribution
to use digital rights management meaning that they cannot use
protocols such as DTLS-SRTP or SDP security descriptions.
Their security architecture is therefore quite different to that
for WebRTC or for telephony, although all use RTP.
When new classes of application arise for a framework
protocol such as RTP, they need to be studied to determine if the
existing protocols and building blocks can provide acceptable
security, satisfying the requirements of the new application
domain. If so, then a mandatory-to-implement specification for
security of this application class needed to be written. If not,
new security building blocks must be defined, then incorporated
into such a mandatory-to-implement security specification. To
maximise interoperability, and reduce specification effort, it is
desirable to use common building blocks for applications with
similar requirements, where possible.
B. Relation to RTP Extension Points
The RTP protocol framework can be extended in various
ways, and a common misconception is that security can
be enforced at the various extension points. Some types of
extension can significantly change the behaviour of the protocol,
so that applications using those extensions form a different
application class, with different security requirements. However,
other types of extension have little or no impact on the security
requirements and properties of the protocol, and can be used
independently by different classes of application.
Two key extension points for RTP are RTP Payload Formats
and RTP Profiles. An RTP Payload Format describes how
a particular media codec can be used with RTP. There are
over 70 standard RTP payload formats defined, along with
numerous proprietary formats. In addition to describing how
codec data is to be encoded in RTP packets, an RTP payload
format specification should describe the security implications
of using that codec with RTP (e.g., if the codec has non-
uniform computational complexity when decoding, and can
potentially be forced to cause a denial of service due to excess
resource consumption). RTP payload formats do not, however,
specify interoperable classes of application using RTP since
media codecs and their associated RTP Payload Formats can
be generally used with many different classes of application.
As such, an RTP Payload Format is neither secure in itself, nor
something to which the requirement for strong security defined
in [14] applies.
An RTP Profile is a larger extension to the RTP protocol
that adapts the RTP framework in some more extensive manner.
Depending on the features provided, an RTP profile might form
the basis for an interoperable class of applications that share
common security requirements. An example is the secure RTP
profile itself, which provides one of the main security options
for RTP suitable for applications that require low overhead.
Not all RTP profiles denote particular classes of application
that share security requirements, however. For example, the
RTP/AVPF profile [34] provides more extensive reception
quality feedback and codec control options, but is used by
a range of applications from source-specific multicast TV
distribution to point-to-point telepresence, with distinct security
requirements. Each RTP profile needs to indicate whether or
not it makes sense to mandate particular security options for all
implementation of the profile. However, there is no expectation
that all RTP profiles will mandate particular security options.
For both extension points, RTP payload formats and RTP
profiles, RTP acts as a framework, allowing flexible extensions
that are suitable for a wide range of applications. Where
particular security requirements and mandates are defined
is at a higher level than RTP: at the level of the complete
system design. That is, one would design a security architecture
for a particular class of applications, and specify a set of
RTP extensions plus a signalling and session establishment
protocol as a whole, defining security properties for that whole.
An example is the WebRTC security architecture [29], that
provides strong security features for the interactive conferencing
implementations in web browsers.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that providing effective strong security
for RTP requires the adoption of a framework approach, using
security building blocks that can be composed to meet the needs
of different classes of application. We have taken these ideas to
IETF [8], [9] and achieved consensus in that community that
the Danvers doctrine and the requirement that Internet standard
protocols include strong security [14] can be addressed at the
level of particular application classes for RTP. The WebRTC
system is the first to adopt a security architecture [29] based
on these ideas.
The issues we identify with securing RTP are illustrative
of a broader problem that will emerge as transport protocols
evolve more flexibility. When a transport protocol has limited
scope, with well defined behaviour across the range of usage
scenarios, then the security requirements are constrained, and
can naturally be implemented at the transport layer. For example,
TLS [23] provides a widely adopted security framework for
TCP, that relies on reliable ordered delivery. Extensions to
other environments are possible, witness DTLS [22], but not
trivial. RTP as a transport covers a broader range of scenarios,
topologies, and use cases than many protocols, and as a result
needed a much broader range of security building blocks. Efforts
are under way in IETF (e.g., the TAPS BoFs at the 89th and
90th IETF meetings) to develop flexible and pluggable transport
protocols, that broaden the reach of transports accessible to
non-real-time applications. These protocols such must aware
of the issues with securing RTP, incorporate the appropriate
security building blocks into their design, and be prepared to
consider non-traditional policies for where in the protocol stack
they enforce mandatory-to-implement security requirements.
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